Tourism revenue sharing policy at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda: a policy arrangements approach

A study on tourism revenue sharing (TRS) at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda, reveals that the policy's governance capacity is low due to structural incongruence among its dimensions—actors, resources, rules of the game, and discourses. Despite participatory reforms, the Uganda Wildlife Authority retains control over resources and sets the rules, leaving local communities undercompensated for conservation costs. Weak communication, unfair distribution, corruption claims, and powerful local elites further exacerbate these issues. The research, based on qualitative data from BINP and surrounding parishes, suggests that addressing inequities in TRS design could enhance its potential to support conservation through development.

Ahebwa, W. M., van der Duim, R., & Sandbrook, C. (2011). Tourism revenue sharing policy at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda: a policy arrangements approach. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 20(3), 377–394. https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2011.622768